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Counterparty Risk and the Establishment of
the New York Stock Exchange Clearinghouse

Asaf Bernstein
University of Colorado at Boulder

Eric Hughson
Claremont McKenna College

Marc Weidenmier
Chapman University and National Bureau of Economic Research

We examine the effect of the establishment of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) clearinghouse in 1892 on counterparty risk using a
novel historical experiment. During this period, the NYSE stocks were
dual-listed on the Consolidated Stock Exchange (CSE), which already
had a clearinghouse. Using identical securities on the CSE as a control,
we find that the introduction of multilateral net settlement through a
clearinghouse substantially reduced volatility of NYSE returns caused
by settlement risk and increased asset values. Our results indicate that
a clearinghouse can improve market stability and value through a reduction in network contagion and counterparty risk.

For more than a century, financial stability has depended
on the resilience under stress of clearinghouses and other
parts of the financial infrastructure. As we rely even more
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heavily on these institutions in the United States and around
the world, we must do all that we can to ensure their resilience, even as our financial system continues to evolve rapidly and in ways that we cannot fully predict. (Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, April 4, 2011)

I. Introduction
On September 14, 2008, dealers from every major Wall Street firm involved in the $600 trillion over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market
came in to work on a Sunday for an unprecedented emergency trading
session. The goal? A frantic effort the day before Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy to try to net counterparty risk in their bilateral OTC
contracts with Lehman and limit the knock-on losses of its collapse on
other financial institutions. Lehman’s global OTC derivatives position
at the time was estimated at $35 trillion in notional value, which included
being a counterparty in 930,000 derivatives transactions representing
$24 billion in counterparty liabilities.1 This ad hoc attempt at clearing
was described by market participants as “a bust,” with very little successful
netting prior to Lehman’s bankruptcy filing.2 The result was an unprecedented rise in counterparty risk, contagion, and financial instability
among global financial market participants exemplified by a dramatic increase in indicators of counterparty risk including the credit default
swap-bond basis and deviations from covered interest rate parity (Levich
2011; Giglio 2013).
The collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent spillovers raised
concerns about the role counterparty risk plays in the stability of the financial system and the importance of clearinghouses in mitigating that
risk. In particular, policy makers in the United States and European Union
have tried to address counterparty risk concerns not only by substantially
increasing counterparty risk-based capital requirements for banks with
Basel III but also by mandating centralized clearing of the majority of
OTC derivatives via the Dodd-Frank and European Markets Infrastructure Regulation Acts. Prior to Lehman’s collapse, OTC derivatives were

Jean-Noel Barrot, Erik Loualiche, Daan Struyven, Stephen Murphy, Nils Wernerfelt, Daniel
Green, and Michael Abrahams for helpful comments. We greatly appreciate Janet Linde
and the New York Stock Exchange Archives for their assistance in accessing historical archives. We also wish to thank the Lowe Institute of Political Economy and the Financial
Economics Institute at Claremont McKenna College for financial support. Any errors are
our own. Data are provided as supplementary material online.
1
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. First Creditors Section 341 Meeting, January 29, 2009,
Summe (2012), and their most recent 10Q filing on July 10, 2008.
2
Financial Times, “Dealers Hold Emergency Trading Session,” September 15, 2008.
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not required to engage in multilateral net settlement through a centralized clearinghouse and often relied on bilateral netting and ad hoc margin requirements between counterparties. Under bilateral netting, traders can be exposed to additional counterparty risk through contagion,
since if one trader defaults he can set off a cascade of additional defaults.
All else being equal, when OTC derivatives contracts instead engage in
multilateral netting, Cecchetti, Gyntelberg, and Hollanders (2009) estimate that gross notional exposures can be reduced by as much as 90 percent. Policy makers point to these potential ex post netting benefits and
the rise in counterparty risk concerns after Lehman’s bankruptcy as evidence that mandated OTC derivative clearing would reduce the probability of an initial default as well as counterparty risk arising from contagion.
Despite the response of policy makers, academic evidence of the effects
of centralized clearing on financial stability and asset values is still unclear.
From a theoretical standpoint, Duffie and Zhu (2011) demonstrate that a
single party clearing all assets should reduce counterparty risk, ceteris paribus, leading to lower volatility and higher asset value, but this result does
not generalize to multiple clearinghouses or a single clearinghouse that
does not clear all transactions. Acharya and Bisin (2014) establish that
in the absence of a clearinghouse, there can be a counterparty externality
that encourages excess risk taking; but Pirrong (2009) shows that a clearinghouse itself can reduce monitoring incentives, which subsequently increases moral hazard and counterparty risk. Biais, Hedier, and Hoerova
(2012) also note that a reduction in idiosyncratic risk from clearing may
endogenously increase systematic risk taking, and Menkveld, Pagnotta,
and Zoican (2013) point out that if the introduction of a clearinghouse
causes increases in collateral and margin requirements, then the effect
of funding and market liquidity on asset prices makes the response of
prices theoretically ambiguous (see also Garleanu and Pedersen 2011).
Therefore, the effect of the introduction of a clearinghouse on asset prices
remains inevitably an empirical question.
Unfortunately, empirical evidence on the role of centralized clearing is
still limited and the effects on counterparty risk are mixed. Examining the
introduction of a clearinghouse for Nordic equities in 2009, Menkveld
et al. (2013) find that centralized clearing reduces asset values, but Loon
and Zhong (2014) show that the centralized clearing of credit derivative
contracts in 2009 actually increased their values. Interpretation of these
opposing empirical results can be challenging because in both cases clearing was driven by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008 and
the resulting financial crisis. It is hard to know if the introduction of a
clearinghouse in those markets was coincident with the subsequent deterioration or improvement in fundamental value and risk of those securities chosen to be cleared. It is precisely because the introduction of the
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clearinghouse was a response to a crisis that makes it problematic to attribute any changes in liquidity or counterparty risk to the clearinghouse
and why it is important to control for economic conditions.
Fortunately, history provides an experiment to study the effects of a
clearinghouse on counterparty risk where we can directly control for fundamental value. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the Consolidated Stock Exchange (CSE) was a major exchange that competed head to head with the Big Board, traded many New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed securities, and, as noted by Brown, Mulherin, and
Weidenmier (2008), averaged more than a 50 percent market share during
the 1890s. Located across the street from the NYSE, the CSE netted stock
transactions through a clearinghouse starting in 1886, while the NYSE did
not until May of 1892.3 Neither exchange clearinghouse mutualized the
risk of trading with a guarantee fund but rather facilitated multilateral netting across all members by centralizing clearing. Using identical securities
on the two exchanges, we compare relative prices on the NYSE with those
on the CSE both before and after the introduction of the NYSE clearinghouse, which allows us to control for changes in fundamental security value
and volatility. This allows for clean identification of the causal effect on asset prices of the introduction of the clearinghouse by controlling for economic conditions in a way that is difficult to replicate with modern data.4
We also examine the relative prices for more than 30 years following the
introduction of a clearinghouse, allowing us to observe the behavior during periods of relative calm and crisis as well as allowing time for endogenous general equilibrium effects by market participants.
We find that the introduction of netting on the NYSE increased the value
of stocks relative to the CSE by 24 basis points (bp). Consistent with the
findings by McSherry, Wilson, and McAndrews (2017), who document a
decline in broker defaults on the NYSE after the introduction of clearing,
the empirical results suggest that multilateral netting through an exchange clearinghouse increases rather than reduces equity values. Because brokers had to fund positions overnight, daily borrowing rates
were a major determinant of counterparty risk. Prior to the introduction
of clearing, a one standard deviation (3.7 percentage point) increase in
the overnight collateralized borrowing rate for brokers, also known as
the call loan rate, is associated with an 8 bp decline in the value of a stock
on the NYSE relative to the identical security on the CSE. After the intro3
The CSE began competing head to head with the NYSE in 1885 when the rival exchange began trading securities on the Big Board using their ticker. This action set off a
lengthy legal battle between the two exchanges, with the NYSE ultimately establishing ownership of its price quotes (Mulherin, Netter, and Overdahl 1991).
4
The beginning of multilateral net settlement through a clearinghouse on the NYSE in
1892 was driven by a variety of factors, most notably financial panics in the early 1890s
(McSherry and Wilson 2013). This again highlights the need to use the CSE as a control
to cleanly identify the effect of counterparty risk.
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duction of clearing, shocks to the call loan rate no longer affect prices on
the NYSE relative to the CSE, suggesting a decline in the volatility of NYSE
prices. Consistent with this prediction, we find that relative to the CSE,
NYSE daily return volatility due to settlement risk is reduced by as much
as 26.9 percent of daily fundamental volatility, immediately following the
introduction of centralized clearing, and remains low, even during subsequent financial crises, in the subsequent 34 years.
Centralized clearing on the NYSE was also introduced in stages, so we
also examine the staggered introduction and find that at least half of the
average reduction in counterparty risk is driven by a reduction in contagion risk through spillovers in the trader network. We run a series of robustness tests to demonstrate that our results are driven by changes in
counterparty risk coming from the introduction of clearing rather than
changes in asynchronous trading, market liquidity improvements on the
NYSE, a decrease in market liquidity on the CSE, or financial crises. This
includes showing that our results hold when using prices for dual-listed
securities on the Boston Stock Exchange instead of the CSE as a control.
Our results do not hold, however, without the CSE control, demonstrating again the importance of controlling for macroeconomic changes in
fundamental value and volatility coincident with the introduction of a
clearinghouse. We also find that the introduction of mutualization of
risk and a formal centralized counterparty (CCP) by the NYSE clearinghouse in April of 1920 does not alter the benefits found from the introduction of centralized clearing with multilateral netting in 1892, providing additional evidence consistent with a role for CCPs in improving
financial stability in asset markets.5
Section II begins with a brief historical background on the introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE. We describe the data used in
Section III. In Section IV, we present the empirical methodology and
predictions. We discuss the empirical results in Section V. Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. Historical and Institutional Background
A.

Trading on the NYSE Prior to Clearing

Like OTC derivatives today, NYSE equities settled on a bilateral rather
than a multilateral basis prior to the introduction of a clearinghouse
in 1892. In the absence of multilateral netting, brokers are required to
write and receive checks/securities for every transaction. To illustrate,
consider the hypothetical set of transactions in figure 1. Broker A sells
5
Risk mutualization, which is employed by the 1920 clearinghouse but not the 1892 clearinghouse, is netting by novation, in which the clearinghouse becomes the counterparty for
each side of the netted transaction balances.
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F IG . 1.—Example 1: visual representation of bilateral trades between three brokers

100 shares of stock for $10,000 ($100/share) to broker B, and later in
the day B sells 100 shares to C for $10,100. In the absence of multilateral
netting, broker C owes a check to broker B for $10,100 and broker B would
owe a check to broker A for $10,000, resulting in $20,100 of checks and
200 shares of stock being transferred. There are direct counterparty risks
since, for example, if broker B defaults (and has no wealth), broker A
loses $10,000; but there is also a possibility of large spillovers causing contagion counterparty risk throughout the trading network. For example, if
broker C defaults (and has no wealth), broker B loses $10,100. If in turn
this pushes broker B into default (and again has no wealth), then A loses
$10,000. As we add more brokers into the network, the chain of defaults
can multiply. Depending on how interconnected the trading network is,
the spillover from contagion could be a substantial component of total
counterparty risk. Eliminating counterparty risk for security A should also
reduce the counterparty risk of security B even if it is unrelated because
there is less chance of a broker, or brokers he is trading with, defaulting
on positions. For clarity we refer to the counterparty risk caused by network spillovers as contagion risk and the remaining risk as direct counterparty
risk.
At the time the NYSE clearinghouse was introduced, securities traded
on the NYSE settled at time T 1 1, which meant all brokers were required to deliver gross checks/securities from trades by the next day
at 2:15 p.m. Brokers engaged in transactions with numerous other brokers throughout the day, so they rarely had enough assets on hand to pay
every single transaction. Customers also bought securities on margin, so
brokers would often have to borrow the additional funds necessary. Therefore, banks were forced to extend significant uncollateralized credit and
day loans to brokers to allow them to fulfill their daily contracts. This practice was called overcertification since banks endorsed checks that certified
an amount greater than the balance in the broker’s account, effectively
providing short-term leverage to brokers to finance their daily positions.6
This bears similarities to modern broker-dealers who use the repo market
6
While technically illegal, overcertification was endemic during the period and was
used by most brokers and banks to finance their overnight positions.
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and asset-backed commercial paper to provide short-term financing for
trades in the OTC markets.7 McSherry and Wilson (2013) find that leverage, measured as the value of certified checks divided by total capital, for
nine “broker banks,” increased from 1.4 to 9.0 from 1875 to 1882. Anecdotal evidence suggests even higher leverage ratios in the 1890s.
Just as short-term collateralized financing rates in the modern period
are set by repo rates, brokers would also finance positions via overnight
collateralized borrowing organized on the floor of the NYSE. The rate to
buy and sell securities on margin via these overnight collateralized loans
was known as the call loan rate. The call loan rate could fluctuate wildly
depending on the market environment. Short-term interest rates were
prone to seasonal increases during the harvest months and tended to increase dramatically during late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
banking panics (Miron 1986; Bernstein, Hughson, and Weidenmier 2010).
For example, the call loan rate reached a daily annualized value of 125 percent during the Panic of 1907 (Moen and Tallman 2003).
The volatility of funding costs to finance overnight positions led to a
significant number of broker defaults and increased counterparty risk.
McSherry et al. (2017) find evidence of a statistically significant relationship between spikes in call loan rates and broker insolvencies during
this period. Contemporaneous researchers, such as Sprague (1910), also
blamed the immediacy of the liquidity requirements inherent in the
NYSE system of daily settlement for broker failures, which tended to
spike during periods of financial stress. During periods of panic, buyers
might walk away from buy orders, leaving brokers with losses and potential defaults on overcertified checks. Anticipating this outcome, Wall Street
banks and trust companies that normally participated in overcertification
might withdraw the privilege extended to brokers. This is exactly what
happened in the Panic of 1873, when banks suspended overcertification
to NYSE brokers. This action led to a suspension of trading for 9 days and
57 broker failures (Eames [1894] 1968). Pratt (1909) notes that by early
1892, R. L. Edwards, the president of the Bank of the State of New York,
threatened that certification for brokers would be cut unless decisive action was taken to lessen the strain on bank lending and clerks.8 NYSE president Francis L. Eames subsequently pushed for the creation of the NYSE
clearinghouse in May of 1892, which engaged in multilateral netting across
all NYSE members (Pratt 1909).
7
It is worth noting, though, that while lending in modern repo markets also extends
massive credit on an intraday basis, this lending is done on a fully collateralized basis.
We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
8
Meeker (1922) also documents that without the introduction of multilateral netting, it
would have been physically impossible to maintain daily settlement. If, however, physical
constraints rather than counterparty risk were the main reason for the introduction of multilateral netting, a perhaps more plausible response would have been to increase the settlement period.
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The NYSE clearinghouse function would then be extended in April of
1920 to include mutualization of risk by acting as a centralized counterparty on trades between all members. The staggered timing of the introduction of centralized clearing and then mutualization of risk provide a
novel setting to try to distinguish the effects of the two major functions
of modern clearinghouses.9 The analysis in 1920 is made more challenging though since accusations of fraud on the CSE in February of 1922,
which led to its eventual downfall, limit our identification strategy in
the post-mutualization period. We therefore focus our primary analysis
on the introduction of centralized clearing in 1892 but also briefly examine the introduction of mutualization in 1920.
B. Timing of the Introduction of Centralized Clearing
on the NYSE
On May 17, 1892, the NYSE introduced multilateral netting for four
stocks. The decision to introduce centralized clearing was driven by
the financial panics of the early 1890s, concerns that banks would restrict
overcertification again, as well as evidence on the effectiveness of multilateral netting used on the CSE.10 Because many NYSE stocks were already centralized clearing on the CSE, we can disentangle the effects
of economic events from the effects of centralized clearing on counterparty risk. As indicated in the clearinghouse meeting minutes, the NYSE
had prescheduled meeting dates and decided that “the list of stocks to
be cleared will be enlarged as members become familiar with the clearing system.” Since having some NYSE stocks clearing had spillover benefits through a reduction in contagion risk for the remainder, the staged
and independent timing of the introduction of multilateral netting for
different securities allows separate identification of contagion and direct
counterparty risk. The NYSE continued to have meetings and clear addi-

9
Securities market clearinghouses serve two primary and distinct functions: multilateral
netting and mutualization of risk. Since clearinghouses observe all trades on a given exchange, they can net transactions across traders in an attempt to reduce the size of outstanding liabilities and subsequent counterparty risk. The NYSE clearinghouse in 1892 engaged in exactly this sort of netting function, which is the primary function of clearing
analyzed in this paper. In today’s regulatory environment, clearinghouses are also typically
mandated to provide mutualization of risk by including themselves as counterparties in all
transactions. In order to more clearly assess the modern implications of our analysis, we
also explore the introduction of mutualization of risk by the NYSE clearinghouse in
1920 but are limited by the length of time available for our empirical methodology in the
post-mutualization period.
10
In fact, by 1892 there were numerous examples of effective clearing systems in the
United States, including the establishment of a clearinghouse for New York City bank deposits in 1853 (Gorton 1985) and for commodity trading on the Chicago Board of Trade in
1883 (Kroszner 1999).
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tional stocks throughout the 1890s, and by the end of 1893, most of the
major securities were clearing.11
C. Trading on the NYSE after Centralized Clearing
To understand the benefits of the introduction of centralized clearing on
the NYSE, we examine multilateral netting between three brokers. A hypothetical set of transactions is shown in figure 2. Each transaction a broker made was recorded on the broker’s clearance sheet for a given day. In
our example, A’s clearance sheet had a single sale, C’s clearing sheet had
a single purchase, and B’s clearance sheet had a purchase and a sale. It is
at this stage that netting occurred, and here, netting occurred only for B.
Broker B bought 100 shares for $10,000 and then immediately sold them
for $10,100.12 The purchase and sale were netted out and B received the
difference of $100. Broker A had a balance to deliver 100 shares valued at
$10,000 and C had a balance to deliver of $10,100. Therefore, A wrote a
draft on the clearinghouse of $10,000, B wrote a draft for $100, and C
wrote a check to the clearinghouse for $10,100. By 10:00 a.m. the next
day, the clearinghouse returned a complete statement to each firm, specifying to whom a delivery must be made by 2:15 p.m. that day (here A delivered to C). Creditors to the clearinghouse received checks for their remaining balances by noon, which were then deposited in the bank
(American Bankers Association 1910).13
Under gross bilateral clearing, there were $20,100 worth of checks and
200 shares that could be defaulted on; but after multilateral netting
there were only $10,100 worth of checks and 100 shares to be transferred. In this case there is a reduction in direct ex post counterparty
risks since with multilateral netting, if broker B defaulted (and had no
wealth), broker A lost nothing. There was also a reduction in spillovers
causing contagion counterparty risk throughout the trading network.
For example, if broker C defaulted (and had no wealth), broker A lost
$10,000; and if broker A defaulted (and had no wealth), broker B lost
only $100. With multilateral netting, typically the chain of defaults does
not grow as quickly as it would with bilateral netting when we add more
brokers into the network.
11
For example, by the end of 1893 more than 80 percent of NYSE volume in Dow Jones
stocks was clearing.
12
This simple example overlooks one complication. In reality, for ease of netting, delivery prices were not simply what one paid or sold his or her shares for, but were instead determined by the clearinghouse. At the end of each day, representatives set a price based on
the quotation of the last day’s sales, which was then announced over the ticker. Small additional checks were then written between parties to account for the differences between
the delivery prices and the actual executed prices (Pratt 1909).
13
These exact times may have varied throughout the years, but they provide a rough picture of the daily operations of the clearinghouse.
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F IG . 2.—Example 2: visual representation of trades between three brokers with clearing.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the NYSE clearinghouse may have
been successful in reducing counterparty risk on the NYSE in the years immediately following its establishment. In the post-clearinghouse period
(i.e., between 1892 and 1920), Pratt (1909) estimated that the demand
for day loans from certifying banks decreased by nearly 65 percent, and
90 percent of all checks were eliminated. On average, transactions in securities valued at $25 million necessitated only $5 million to change
hands. In one case, 204,000 shares, valued at $12.5 million, were settled
by a payment of only $10,000 (Meeker 1922).
That being said, anecdotal evidence of the effect of multilateral netting
on counterparty risk through contagion is mixed. The Chicago Board of
Trade introduced a “ring” settlement system in 1883 similar to the one introduced on the NYSE, and in 1902 the bankruptcy of member George
Phillips led to losses for more than 42 percent of members of the board
(Moser 1998; Kroszner 1999). Direct measures of broker insolvencies also
may not necessarily provide the full picture, since changes in counterparty
risk caused by a clearinghouse could lead to differences in margin requirements, borrowing rates, and commissions between customers, brokers,
and/or banks. The aggregate effect of all these channels should show up
in prices, through either expected losses from counterparties or changes
in the discount rate coming from volatility in counterparty risk and/or
margin-driven asset pricing changes (Garleanu and Pedersen 2011). Another challenge in interpreting effects is controlling for the counterfactual changes in broker defaults and security value and volatility in the absence of a clearinghouse.

D. Consolidated Stock Exchange: An Almost Ideal Control
As illustrated in the time line in figure 3, the CSE, also known as the “Little Board,” was established in New York City in 1885 with 2,403 members
and provides an excellent control for our difference-in-difference anal-
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F IG . 3.—Time line of introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE and CSE. This
time line shows the introduction of a clearinghouse on the CSE in June 1886 and the introduction in stages on the NYSE beginning in May 1892. Data on trading volumes are taken
from Sobel (2000).

ysis of the effect of the introduction of clearing.14 The Little Board competed head to head with the NYSE (Michie 1986). The rival exchange
averaged a respectable 23 percent market share (Brown et al. 2008) over
its 40-year history, although CSE stocks generally had less trading volume
and market liquidity than the same security on the Big Board.15 While
the NYSE waited until 1892 to introduce clearing, the CSE began multilateral net settlement in 1886. As noted by McSherry and Wilson (2013,
23), one reason that the NYSE introduced centralized clearing was that
the CSE had “reduced financing needs and also lowered counterparty
risk and broker defaults” by netting through a clearinghouse.
We provide some suggestive evidence of the impact of the clearinghouse on the CSE by hand-collecting information on broker defaults
from the annual reports of the Consolidated Stock and Petroleum Exchange of New York. Consistent with the contemporaneous accounts,
the CSE clearinghouse was successful in minimizing counterparty risk.
We find that losses from broker defaults were less than 0.03 percent of
total trading volume in 1893, a year that included one of the most severe
financial panics in American history, despite the fact that many of the
old-guard NYSE members at the time considered the much younger
and smaller upstart CSE to be less reputable (Brown et al. 2008).16
14
Figures are based on annual reports of the Consolidated Stock and Petroleum Exchange of New York.
15
Commission rates on the CSE averaged half the brokerage commission charged by the
NYSE, but members trading with each other were charged rates as low as 1/32nd of par
value (Michie 1986). The CSE also specialized in odd-lot trading, and while the NYSE required next-day settlement, the CSE required weekly or semiweekly settlement. Securities
traded on both exchanges will allow us to control for the vast majority of variation in prices
based on any changes in fundamental value, but we will still need to examine the role
played by any differential trends in liquidity, specialization, and market participants on
the two exchanges.
16
Despite the fact that trading sizes and liquidity were lower on the CSE, without knowing more about the balances of the traders themselves, it is hard to say which exchange ac-
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Therefore, prices on the CSE for NYSE-CSE dual-listed stocks provide
an almost ideal control for the price response on the NYSE to the introduction of clearing.17 This is why the introduction of centralized clearing
on the NYSE can be used to identify the causal effects of multilateral netting. In addition to having cross-listed securities, we also benefit from the
close proximity of the two exchanges. Since the two exchanges were
across the street from each other, arbitrageurs could effectively prevent
price discrepancies between the two exchanges not caused by “real differences” such as market illiquidity or counterparty risk premia.18 Nelson
tually had higher-risk market participants. Market participants on the CSE were likely to be
smaller investors but because of this may have taken more conservative positions. This is
made even more challenging since, as noted by Ott (2004), the NYSE ran a very successful
public relations campaign from 1913 to 1929 using relationships at the New York State Attorney General’s Office to damage the CSE’s reputation, which makes it difficult from contemporaneous sources to separate reality from propaganda. For example, Shea (1911, 199)
mentions that “many members after a successful career on the floor of the Consolidated,
have become well-known factors on the New York Stock Exchange, and not one broker
who has thus gone from the former to the latter has failed. As a school of brokerage the
Consolidated is unrivaled.” This passage was written prior to the public campaign against
the CSE and highlights the likely view of the CSE as a younger exchange, but not one of
obvious ill repute.
17
The CSE and NYSE also had similar governance structures and internal regulations.
Both exchanges were cooperatively owned and governed by their members, with a board
of governors, including a president, elected by members of the exchange, and committees
with members appointed by the president overseeing various functions of the exchange.
The constitution of both exchanges also allowed either party in the transaction for the sale
or purchase of stocks, bonds, or any outstanding contracts to call, at any time, a mutual deposit of cash for margin, with as little as 30 minutes’ notice. The NYSE and CSE allowed any
party to demand maintenance margins of 5 percent, while the NYSE and CSE constitutions
provided for initial margin requirements of 10 and 5 percent, respectively. We have found no
change in the official margin requirements in either constitution after 1892, but in practice it
is unclear if these minimal margin constraints were actually binding. As noted in a report by
the CSE’s governor’s Committee on Securities and Commodities in 1909, “the amount of
margin which a broker requires from a speculative buyer of stocks depends, in each case,
on the credit of the buyer” (State of New York 1909, 9). On the basis of minutes from the
NYSE’s Insolvency Committee from 1876–1925, brokers were occasionally removed from
the exchange because they required insufficient margins from customers. In one instance,
for a trader they note that they “found that he was guilty of doing business in an unbusiness
like manner i.e.: without margin.” Even among this subset of potentially reckless brokers, the
majority reported margins of 5–8 percent and sometimes as high as 25 percent, depending
on the reported trustworthiness of customers. All additional information on governance
structure comes from the Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange and Constitution
of the Consolidated Stock Exchange from 1892.
18
One way to conceptually think about these two exchanges could be to imagine one stock
market with different venues for trading the same stocks. An arbitrageur observing stock A
trading for $100/share on the NSYE “venue” and $101 on the CSE “venue” might be tempted
to buy it on the NYSE and immediately sell on the CSE with the hope of a quick riskless profit.
The problem is that if the arbitrageur executed a transaction to buy the NYSE security prior
to the introduction of a clearinghouse and during a time of market duress, there is a significant risk that the counterparty in the deal would fail to settle on the next day and the arbitrageur could face substantial costs. The higher counterparty risk for the transaction on the
NYSE should lead to a persistent time-varying price deviation of executing through each
venue, even though the security itself and subsequently the underlying fundamental value
are the same. We thank an anonymous referee for the motivation for this explanation.

counterparty risk

701

([1907] 1975) dedicates an entire chapter to the “expertise” of arbitrageurs on the CSE who were, he felt, exceeded in their expertise only
by the arbitrageurs on the NYSE. In fact, in table A4 of the online appendix, we show that more than 92 percent of all variation of individual
NYSE stock returns can be explained by the returns of identical securities listed at the same time on the CSE.19 Another benefit of their close
proximity is that both exchanges paid in the same currency. Cross-listed
securities in markets quoted in different currencies are confounded by
the need to convert currencies using OTC foreign exchange (FX) markets. Normally this is not problematic, but since these markets are OTC,
during times of financial distress, FX swaps may also include potentially
significant counterparty risk. For example, Levich (2011) shows that immediately following the Lehman bankruptcy, covered interest rate parity
in the highly liquid FX swap British pound/US dollar deviated from no
arbitrage conditions (in the absence of counterparty risk) by hundreds
of basis points.20
III. Data Description
A.

Security Market Data

We focus our empirical analysis on common stocks in the Dow Jones indices using monthly data from September 1886 to December 1925 because these securities tended to be very liquid and traded on both the
NYSE and CSE (Brown et al. 2008). We use the original Dow Jones index
from September 1886 until October 1896, when the index is then split
into the Dow Jones Railroad Index and the Industrial Index. We use
hand-collected data from the New York Times and Commercial and Financial
Chronicle for each security in the index at a given point in time and rely on
Farrell (1972) for changes in the composition of the indices. Data are
sampled from the last trading day of each month. We collected firmspecific information on NYSE high, low, open, and closing transaction
prices; bid and ask closing prices; and trading volume. It is worth noting

19
By comparison, Lewellen (2014) regresses monthly stock returns on lagged individual
firm stock returns, size, and book-to-market ratios and on average explains only 3.3 percent
of cross-sectional variation in NYSE stock returns from 1964 to 2013. Even when including
15 lagged stock-specific individual factors expected to explain stock returns, he finds that
less than 8 percent of cross-sectional variation in returns is explainable.
20
Another benefit of proximity, besides the ones previously emphasized, is that since
both exchanges were in the same time zone, daily data on opening and closing prices
are easily comparable. The reason is not only that it reduces timing mismatches in the
quotes but also that they are comparable periods of the trading day. Oftentimes opening
and closing price behavior can behave differently, and while high-frequency quotes allow
for quotations across time zones at the same time of day, this cannot be done while also
preserving the period of the trading day considered.
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TABLE 1
NYSE and CSE Summary Statistics

NYSE
Closing
Price

NYSE
Trading
Volume
(No.
Shares)

CSE
Trading
Volume NYSE Trading
(No.
Volume
Shares)
($000s)

CSE Trading
Volume
($000s)

NYSE
Bid-Ask
Spread
(bp)

With Minimum 1 Share Traded (n 5 9,373)
Mean
Median
Standard
deviation
Minimum
Maximum

84.4
81.4

13,726
4,400

3,241
410

42.4
4
323

29,340
5
489,444

8,710
5
291,870

1,352
324

322
29

3,304
.2
52,300

965

52
32
.04

24,100

66
7
1,818

With Minimum 200 Shares Traded (n 5 6,065)
Mean
Median
Standard
deviation
Minimum
Maximum

85.5
81.0

19,911
8,425

4,958
1,150

41.1
4.7
319.5

34,912
200
489,444

10,432
200
291,870

1,972
644

493
88

3,966
3.6
52,300

1,164
1.4
24,100

41
26
52
7
1,481

Note.—This table reports the sample statistics for the trading data for stocks on the
NYSE and the CSE. Security market data were hand-collected at a monthly frequency from
the New York Times and Commercial and Financial Chronicle from September 1886 to December 1925 for all stocks in the Dow Jones indices. All data are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles. To be included in the first level of summary analysis a security must trade
at least one share on both exchanges on a given date, while for the second, which is the one
used in our primary econometric specifications, we require at least 200 shares (two standard contracts).

in table 1 that, consistent with anecdotal accounts, liquidity on the CSE
was worse than on the NYSE. Bid-ask spreads were higher and volume
lower for identical securities.21 For NYSE stocks listed on the CSE, we use
data on CSE closing prices as well as CSE trading volume. We also use
hand-collected monthly data on seat prices for the NYSE and CSE for
the period 1888–1925 from the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. In addi-

21
As mentioned previously, when the CSE was first introduced, it specialized in trading
odd lots of shares. Prior to volume rising dramatically after 1900, security trading days with
total share volume greater than 200 shares among members of the Dow Jones indices with
nonmultiples of 100 shares constituted 90 percent and 92 percent of security-days on the
NYSE and CSE, respectively. This is consistent with the CSE engaging in more odd-lot trading than the NYSE but suggests that both the NYSE and CSE typically had at least one odd
lot per security-day. This may not be too surprising since by this time the NYSE and CSE
traded both odd and regular lots. For example, Ott (2004) shows that by 1921, 40 percent
of business on the NYSE was for odd lots, and Shea (1911, 198) noted that “lots of 500 to
1,000 shares in single blocks are frequently turned over [on the CSE].”
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tion, we collect daily closing bid and ask quotes on the NYSE starting in
1893.22 We also use end-of-month broker call loan rates from the NBER
macrohistory database for the entire sample period.
For robustness checks, we hand-collected daily data on high, low, closing, and opening transaction prices as well as trading volumes from January 1892 to December 1901 for all stocks on the NYSE, CSE, and the
Boston Stock Exchange (BSE). Closing prices for the BSE are collected
from the Boston Globe for 1892–1901 at a weekly frequency. We construct
an absolute difference estimator using daily high, low, opening, and closing transaction prices to estimate CSE bid-ask spreads and NYSE bid-ask
spreads prior to 1893. Our estimated NYSE bid-ask spreads have an 88 percent correlation with actual bid-ask spreads on the Big Board from 1892
to 1925. Our estimator performs slightly better in-sample than one used
by Corwin and Schultz (2012), which has an 81 percent correlation with
actual NYSE spreads over the same period. In addition, our estimator has
the desirable property, since unlike that used by Corwin and Schultz, it is
always positive, which was not the case for our Corwin-Schultz bid-ask estimates in our sample period. For more details on the methodology and a
comparison of the bid-ask spreads, see appendix B.
B. Clearinghouse Data
The NYSE started centralized clearing securities in stages, beginning
with four stocks on May 17, 1892, followed by four additional stocks each
week. By 1894, more than 90 percent of volume was cleared on the exchange, and only a handful of stocks were subsequently added to the clearinghouse each year (based on authors’ calculations). The dates stocks
were added and dropped from centralized clearing on the NYSE were reported in the minutes of the Committee on the Clearinghouse of the New
York Stock Exchange at the NYSE archives. The minutes of the clearinghouse were useful for understanding the function and implementation
of netting trades on the exchange. Data on broker defaults on the NYSE
were collected from the NYSE archives Committee on Admissions and
List of Suspended Members. Information on CSE broker defaults were
collected from the annual reports of the Consolidated Stock and Petroleum Exchange of New York.

22
Beginning on May 24, 1882, the New York Times reports NYSE bid-ask spreads on a daily
basis. The data on daily bid-ask spreads continue through April 14, 1886. Between April 15,
1886, and May 12, 1893, the New York Times does not report bid-ask spreads for the NYSE. In
this time interval, we gather monthly bid-ask spread data from the Commercial and Financial
Chronicle. The bid-ask spread data are reported for Thursday trading and are matched with
the appropriate trading volume data from the New York Times.
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IV. Empirical Predictions and Methodology
A.

Theoretical Predictions

In the presence of counterparty risk and market liquidity costs, we can
decompose the price of any traded asset into its fundamental value minus market liquidity costs and counterparty risk, plus any additional market microstructure noise:
CP
1 ei,t,E ,
Pi,t,E 5 Pi,tFun 2 Pi,t,E 2 Pi,t,E
MktLq

(1)

where Pi,t,E is the price on exchange E (except the NYSE) for stock i at
MktLq
time t; Pi,tFun is the firm’s exchange invariant fundamental value; Pi,t,E is
the discount caused by the market illiquidity premia, which include both
the explicit and implicit costs of trading and how they covary with the
pricing kernel23 (Acharya and Pedersen 2005; Brunnermeier and PederCP
is the discount caused by the
sen 2009; Garleanu and Pedersen 2011); Pi,t,E
counterparty risk premium; and ei,t,E is market microstructure noise with
mean zero, such as bid-ask bounce. This decomposition arises naturally
from the original framework of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), where investors who buy securities anticipate paying transactions costs when selling
them, as do the next buyers. Consequently, when valuing the asset the investor rationally discounts the fundamental value by the present value of
the expected future transaction costs. If we consider the same asset trading
on two exchanges, E and E 0 , then even in the presence of active arbitrageurs, the price should differ whenever there are differential trading costs,
liquidity, and counterparty risk by the following spread:
CP
CP
2 Pi,t,E
1 ei,t,E 2 ei,t,E :
Pi,t,E 2 Pi,t,E 5 Pi,t,E 2 Pi,t,E 1 Pi,t,E
0

MktLq
0

MktLq

0

0

(2)

A substantial literature has documented these kinds of price spreads
among securities paying the same cash flows. A few examples of such deviations include on-the-run Treasuries that trade at lower yields than offthe-run Treasuries (Amihud and Mendelson 1991), restricted resale stocks
that trade at a substantial discount to publicly traded stock (Silber 1992),
corporate bond versus identical name credit default swap (CDS) spreads
(Duffie 2010), and corporate bond variations in spreads among identical
CDS contracts (Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaff 2012). The sign of these deviations depends on the relative trading costs in both markets and whether
costs are borne more by buyers or sellers. A number of empirical papers
including work by Amihud (2002), Jones (2002), and Acharya and
Pedersen (2005) have documented that in modern markets stocks that
23
The explicit costs include commissions and the bid-ask spread, while implicit costs include price movement from larger orders (market depth), borrowing costs to finance the
trading position (margin), and stocking additional inventory.
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are more illiquid trade at discounted prices and have higher expected returns. These results are also consistent with research on fire sales in asset
prices (Coval and Stafford 2007; Benmelech and Bergman 2011) in
which sellers of assets are those in need of liquidity and thus are willing
to sell the security at a discount, which means that market illiquidity costs
asymmetrically affect market participants and subsequently alter traded
asset prices. So holding counterparty risk constant, if market liquidity
were better (except lower bid-ask spreads) on exchange E than on E 0 ,
we would expect the prices for identical securities on E 0 to trade at a discount. If, on the other hand, market liquidity is lower on exchange E but
counterparty risk is higher on E than on E 0 , then the direction of the price
spread is ambiguous. Since traders that face a liquidity shock are more
likely to be asset sellers and a high counterparty risk in transactions, securities that trade on exchanges with higher counterparty risk are likely to
trade at a relative discount.
To illustrate this point consider a simplified model with N risk-neutral
traders in a competitive market in which each trader, n, has a random
endowment, Q i,n, of assets, i, each asset trades at a price Pi, and the total
trader’s portfolio value, An, is the aggregated value of all assets so that
An 5

oQ

i,n

Pi,n :

i

Let each trader also owe a fixed value of notional debt, Dn, such that if
An < Dn , the trader is forced to liquidate all assets. If this forced liquidation occurs, then all trading counterparties and debt holders recover a
fixed percent, Rn, of the total liabilities owed, which is just
Rn 5

An
,
Dn 1 Sn

where Sn is the total amount owed by trader n for outstanding trades after
settlement. Buyers of securities do not know the value of the trading
portfolio of their counterparties but do know the distributional properties of the endowment shock. Since markets are competitive and agents
are risk neutral, the value of any security for buyers is equal to
Pi 5 PiFun ð1 2 En ½ð1 2 Ri ÞÞ,
where PiFun is the fundamental value of the security, in the absence of
counterparty risk,24 and En ½ð1 2 Ri Þ is the expected losses due to counterparty risk across all traders in asset i. As long as some positive number of
traders are forced to sell assets, then buyers will rationally discount the
value of these securities. Since markets are competitive and subject to
market-clearing conditions (i.e., assets are in short-run fixed net supply),
24

Or other market trading costs, which for simplicity are excluded from this model.
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traders sell only if forced to liquidate and all buyers of these securities are
unconstrained (no counterparty risk) traders. Only those traders forced to
liquidate have recoveries less than 100 percent, so counterparty risk induces
a discounted price in equilibrium. As the expected recovery falls, this premium rises. So in times of distress, when endowment dispersion is large, this
premium should be large, while in less turbulent times it could be close to
zero. It also means that if the same security is traded in two markets with differing levels of counterparty risk, it should trade at a discount on whichever
exchange has the highest counterparty risk, even in the presence of active
arbitrageurs on both exchanges. Just as in the case of other trading costs
(except bid-ask spreads, trading fees) considered in models of market illiquidity by a number of previous authors including Amihud and Mendelson
(1991), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and Garleanu and Pedersen (2011),
counterparty risk costs are asymmetrically borne by buyers and sellers, leading to predictable price changes in equilibrium.25
B. Baseline Empirical Methodology
The expected change in the NYSE price after the introduction of centralized clearing equals the change in the stock price caused by changes
in the fundamental value minus changes in the expected market illiquidity and counterparty risk premia or, equivalently,
 MktLq 
CP
:
(3)
E ½DPi,NYSE  5 E ½DPiFun  2 E DPi,t,NYSE 2 E ½DPi,t,NYSE
If we assume that the expected market illiquidity premium is unaffected
by the introduction of multilateral netting, an assumption that we will
examine later, we can rewrite (3) as
CP
,
E ½DPi,NYSE  5 E ½DPiFun  2 E ½DPi,t,NYSE

(4)

where expected changes in price are driven by changes in expected fundamental value and the counterparty risk premium.
CP
, the change in the counterWe are interested in estimating E½DPi,t,NYSE
party risk premium caused by the introduction of multilateral netting. If
the introduction of the clearinghouse were exogenous, we could simply
estimate a panel regression
Pi,t,NYSE 5 ai 1 D1fclear,i,t g 1 ei,t ,

(5)

25
As in Acharya and Pedersen (2005), the fact that equities are in positive net supply can
also lead to price discounts as trading costs rise, even without asymmetries between buyers
and sellers. A precise investigation of whether price discounts in this setting are driven by
the positive net supply of securities or asymmetric counterparty risk is beyond the scope of
this paper. In either case, though, a rise in counterparty risk on a given exchange should
lead to a predictable price discount, in expectation.
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where 1{clear,i,t} is a dummy variable indicating when a stock starts being included in centralized clearing and D is the average treatment effect of centralized clearing on the stock price. The problem, as shown in equation (4),
is that if the introduction of centralized clearing coincides with changes
in the fundamental value of the firm, omitted variables rather than counterparty risk changes could be driving results. Here, for example, the introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE was driven, in part, by financial panics in the early 1890s (McSherry and Wilson 2013). Without
an alternative identification strategy, it would be impossible to identify
the effect of the introduction of the NYSE clearinghouse. Fortunately,
our historical experiment provides a unique opportunity to do exactly this.
Ideally, to determine the effect of centralized clearing on counterparty risk, we would have prices for identical securities that do not experience any change in counterparty risk to control for changes in asset
value not related to clearing. Fortunately, such securities exist. During the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, stocks were dual-listed on
the NYSE and CSE. Further, there was no change in the trading environment at the CSE when the NYSE introduced its clearinghouse. For the
CSE price we have
CP
1 ei,t,CSE :
Pi,t,CSE 5 Pi,tFun 2 Pi,t,CSE 2 Pi,t,CSE
MktLq

(6)

Using the CSE prices as a control, the difference in prices between the
dual-listed securities is
CP
CP
2 Pi,t,NYSE
Pi,t,NYSE 2 Pi,t,CSE 5 Pi,CSE 2 Pi,NYSE 1 Pi,t,CSE
MktLq

MktLq

1 ei,t,NYSE 2 ei,t,CSE ,

(7)

where the fundamental value drops out of the equation. Then looking at
the difference after the introduction of centralized clearing, we have
 MktLq 
 MktLq 
CP
, (8)
E ½DPi,NYSE  2 E ½DPi,CSE  5 E DPi,t,CSE 2 E DPi,t,NYSE 2 E ½DPi,t,NYSE
so that the difference-in-differences between the expected prices on the
two exchanges is caused by changes in the relative market illiquidity premium and changes in the counterparty risk premium on the NYSE. If there
is no change in centralized clearing on the CSE, then the expected change
CP
, is zero and drops out of
in the CSE counterparty risk premium, E½DPi,t,CSE
equation (8).
If the difference in expected market liquidity between the two exchanges
is the same before and after the introduction of centralized clearing on
the NYSE,26 then the difference-in-difference in prices can be written as
26
It is worth noting that even if the exchanges have differing levels of market liquidity
prior to the introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE, the difference-in-difference
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CP
DE ½Pi,t,NYSE  2 DE ½Pi,t,CSE  5 2E ½DPi,t,NYSE
,

(9)

which is a causal estimate of the effect of centralized clearing on the
counterparty risk premium. Formally, our baseline empirical specification is
P^i,t,NYSE 2 P^i,t,CSE 5 ai 1 D1fclear,i,t g 1 Xi,t 0 b 1 ei,t ,

(10)

where P^i,t,CSE and P^i,t,NYSE are the normalized closing prices on the NYSE
and CSE.
Throughout our analysis, we consider two normalizations for price:
(1) dividing by the average closing prices on both exchanges and (2) dividing by the NYSE bid-ask spread. The former is natural since it is the
percentage premium or discount an investor would require for buying
the same stock on the NYSE relative to the CSE. The latter is also intuitive since it adjusts for the relative cost of trading the security and indicates how many bid-ask spreads the price on the NYSE deviates from the
same security on the CSE. As discussed above, 1{clear,i,t} is a dummy variable
indicating when a stock starts centralized clearing and D is the average
treatment effect of centralized clearing on the relative normalized stock
prices. In addition, we include stock-specific time-varying controls, Xi,t,
including bid-ask spreads and volumes.
It is important to note that in this core specification, we are implicitly
assuming that there are no spillovers in counterparty risk reduction
when only a fraction of NYSE stocks join the clearinghouse. That is, it
is likely that counterparty risk for stocks not yet cleared will fall once a
sufficient fraction of NYSE stock volume is cleared. We investigate such
spillover effects in Section IV.D.
C. Price Volatility Induced by Counterparty Risk
Because counterparty risk was driven by the costs of financing overnight
positions, we expect the counterparty risk premium to be small during
periods of calm but increase dramatically during times of financial market distress. Because the cost of financing overnight positions was likely
much less after the onset of multilateral netting, its introduction may
have significantly reduced or eliminated the impact of short-term financing shocks on NYSE stocks. Hence, interest rate shocks should not re-

framework just relies on the same relative changes in liquidity following the introduction
of the NYSE clearinghouse. A concern could be that trading might migrate to the NYSE
since the clearinghouse improved the NYSE trading environment, which might also result
in a degradation of trading conditions on the CSE. We show, however, that trading volumes, spreads, and percentage of days with at least one odd-lot trade on both exchanges
changed in a parallel fashion after the NYSE clearinghouse was introduced.
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duce stock prices on the NYSE relative to the CSE after the establishment
of a clearinghouse.27 We formalize this test by interacting call loan rates
with the clearinghouse dummy to yield the following specification:
P^i,t,NYSE 2 P^i,t,CSE 5 ai 1 D1fclear,i,t g 1 D2 Ct  1fclear,i,t g 1 fCt
1Xi,t 0 b 1 ei,t ,

(11)

where Ct is the call loan rate, f is the estimated effect of call loan rate
spikes on NYSE relative prices before clearing, and D2 is the estimated
effect of the introduction of centralized clearing on call loan rate sensitivity.
Before the introduction of the NYSE clearinghouse, interest rate volatility and the volatility of the NYSE-CSE price spread will move in response to
fluctuations in counterparty risk. If we consider the change in volatility of
the price difference, instead of the expectation, and make slightly stronger assumptions (relative to those needed to arrive at eq. [9]),28 then we
can rewrite equation (9) as
CP
:
Dj½Pi,t,NYSE 2 Pi,t,CSE  5 Dj½Pi,t,NYSE

(12)

Equation (12) indicates that the change in the volatility of the price premium provides an estimate of the change in counterparty risk volatility
caused by clearing. We estimate the volatility of price spreads by taking
the absolute value of the price differences between the exchanges on
each date normalized by the average closing price on the exchanges
and then scaling by a constant to generate an estimate for the volatility.29
In our robustness analysis, we also consider the volatility estimator using
the ratio of the high and low prices on each exchange presented in Parkinson (1980).

27
One might wonder whether the onset of multilateral netting might also affect the
magnitude of interest rate shocks. Although this is theoretically a possibility, anecdotal evidence (see Meeker 1922) suggests that the main driver of shocks to the call loan rate was
the commercial paper market. Indeed Bernstein et al. (2010) find that the correlation between the commercial paper rate and the call loan rate was over 90 percent during our
sample period.
28
Previously we assumed no changes in the relative market illiquidity premium. In this
case we need to assume no changes in the volatility of the market illiquidity premium; but
in addition we have to assume no change in the volatility of relative market microstructure
noise or in the covariance between the counterparty risk premia, market illiquidity premia,
and/or market microstructure premia.
29
If X ∼ N ðm, jÞ, then the absolute value of X is distributed folded-normally. Then if the
expected normalized price difference is sufficiently small relative to thepvolatility,
then the
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
volatility is proportional to the absolute value of X. In particular, j ≈ p=2E½jX j. In our
analysis the expected normalized price difference is significantly smaller than the volatility,
so our estimated volatility using this approximation is within approximately 1 bp of the
change in volatility accounting for any changes in the mean normalized price difference.
For a complete discussion of the estimator and its properties, see online app. C.
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D. Counterparty Risk and Contagion
Counterparty risk can be divided into two parts: contagion risk and direct counterparty risk. Contagion risk is higher for an asset when a broker is more likely to default on other positions, starting a cascade that
results in default on a trade for that asset. When other stocks start to
clear, contagion risk is smaller, even if the asset is traded through a clearinghouse. We define the reduction in direct counterparty risk as the direct effect of a stock centrally clearing after accounting for any contagion risk reduction. One of the benefits of analyzing the introduction
of centralized clearing on the NYSE is that centralized clearing was introduced in stages. Using prices on the CSE as a control again, we can decompose the volatility induced by counterparty risk by estimating the following model:


P^i,t,NYSE 2 P^i,t,CSE  5 ai 1 D1fclear,i,t g 1 gPercCleari,t 1Xi,t 0 b 1 ei,t ,
(13)
where PercCleari,t is the percentage of stocks already clearing.30 We also
include a dummy for the stock that is centralized clearing, which allows a
natural interpretation for D as the change in counterparty risk caused by
direct counterparty risk, while g is the percent caused by a change in
contagion risk.31 Since the breakdown of these two types of risk depends
on how connected traders of those securities are to the network of traders, we would expect these to vary across securities. In particular, we
might expect securities with traders who are more exposed to traders
in the rest of the network, such as large firms with high-volume securities, to be more exposed to contagion risk.32
V. Results
We first compare the sign and volatility of the counterparty risk premium
before and after the introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE.
To do so, we reconsider equation (7):

30
We consider weights both by dollar sales and equally but focus on dollar sales for
our primary analysis since it is more representative of the actual volume of trading of the
security.
31
In this setting even if inclusion in the clearinghouse was anticipated, prices would not
adjust in response, since arbitrageurs would still be exposed to any counterparty risk in
transacting to try to “take advantage” of the price discount any day prior to the actual inclusion of the stock in the list of centrally cleared securities.
32
While it seems intuitive that high trading volumes would seem to suggest more interconnected traders, without specifics on the exact nature of the network, it is impossible to
know with certainty which security types are most exposed to contagion. It becomes an empirical question, based on how D in eq. (13) varies with security trading volume.
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Pi,t,NYSE 2 Pi,t,CSE 5 P

MktLq
i,CSE

2P

MktLq
i,NYSE

CP
CP
1 Pi,t,CSE
2 Pi,t,NYSE

1 ei,t,NYSE 2 ei,t,CSE :
Because the NYSE is more liquid than the CSE (Brown et al. [2008] and
table 1 summary statistics), the price discount due to illiquidity should
MktLq
MktLq
be smaller on the NYSE: E½Pi,CSE 2 Pi,NYSE  > 0. Therefore, when counterparty risk is small, stocks should trade at a premium on the NYSE relative
to the CSE. In times of financial market crisis before stocks are cleared
on the NYSE, stocks on the NYSE might well trade at a discount instead
because during crises, counterparty risk might be much larger on the
NYSE than on the CSE. Before the introduction of centralized clearing
on the NYSE then, stocks trade at a discount on the NYSE when the
counterparty risk premium is high and at a slight premium otherwise.
If the introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE eliminates (or
substantially reduces) counterparty risk there, equation (7) implies that
after the onset of clearing, prices on the Big Board should be consistently
higher than those on the CSE.
In figure 4 we plot the average for all Dow stocks of the 12-month moving average of the price on the NYSE minus the price on the CSE normalized by the NYSE bid-ask spread. Prior to the introduction of centralized clearing, this price difference is highly volatile; but after the
introduction of clearing, stocks on the NYSE consistently trade at a premium. In table 2, we estimate equation (10) to show that the introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE reduces the average counterparty risk premium by 24 bp or 0.73 NYSE bid-ask spreads.33 NYSE prices
are 9 bp lower on average than CSE prices prior to clearing but 15 bp
higher afterward. This result is robust to including stock-specific timevarying market liquidity controls on the NYSE and CSE, including the bidask spread on the NYSE, the dollar trading volume on the NYSE, and the
dollar trading volume on the CSE. The result is not robust, however, to
not using the CSE as a control.34 This highlights the importance of using
identical securities traded on the CSE to control for the changing macroeconomic environment.
The 24 bp reduction is a substantial decline in the counterparty risk
premium. This estimate for the reduction in the counterparty risk
33
On the basis of statistics in McSherry et al. (2017), it appears that as a percentage of
total NYSE trading volume, initial reported losses from broker insolvencies fall approximately 42 bp in the period after the introduction of a clearinghouse. If we account for subsequent partial recovery of those losses, this appears consistent in magnitude with the estimates we obtain for the fall in counterparty risk premium coming from the decline in
expected losses with our formal difference-in-difference analysis of prices. The specification includes firm fixed effects, clustering standard errors at the stock level, and using
identical securities on the CSE as a control.
34
These results are available from the authors on request.

F IG . 4.—Counterparty risk premium and introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE (1887–1925). In this figure we show the estimated effect of
the introduction of multilateral net settlement through a centralized clearing party on the closing price of a stock on the NYSE relative to the closing price
on the CSE for the same security on the same day. Security market data were hand-collected at a monthly frequency from the New York Times and Commercial
and Financial Chronicle from September 1886 to December 1925 for all stocks in the Dow Jones indices. To be included in the analysis a security must trade
at least 200 shares on both exchanges on a given date. All data are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. NYSE 2 CSE/NYSE Bid-Ask is the price on
the NYSE minus the CSE normalized by the bid-ask spread on the NYSE, and Call Loan Rate is the overnight collateralized broker borrowing rate. The
period prior to the establishment of the NYSE clearinghouse May 17, 1892, is highlighted in gray.
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TABLE 2
Price Deviations and Establishment of NYSE Clearinghouse
Dependent Variable
NYSE 2
NYSE 2
NYSE 2
NYSE 2
NYSE 2
NYSE 2
CSE/
CSE/NYSE
CSE/
CSE/
CSE/Close
CSE/
Close (%)
Bid-Ask
Close (%) Close (%)
(%)
Close (%)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Clearinghouse

.237***
(.062)

.733***
(.126)

.234***
(.061)

Call loan rate
Call loan rate 
clearinghouse
Constant
Security fixed
effects
Liquidity
controls
Only clearinghouse
No. clusters
Observations
Adjusted R 2

.230***
.122*
(.061)
(.068)
2.0029
2.0217***
(.0019)
(.0055)

2.093*
(.048)

.0022
(.0017)

.0247***
(.0058)
2.0083
(.0055)

2.0062
(.023)

2.094**
(.040)

2.295***
(.082)

2.107**
(.045)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
90
5,997
.0086

No
90
5,984
.0056

No
90
5,994
.0104

No
90
5,994
.0105

No
90
5,994
.0138

Yes
51
3,904
.0326

Note.—Following econometric specifications (9) and (10), in this table we show the estimated effect of the introduction of multilateral net settlement through a centralized
clearing party on the closing price of a stock on the NYSE relative to the closing price on
the CSE for the same security on the same day. Security market data were hand-collected
at a monthly frequency from the New York Times and Commercial and Financial Chronicle from
September 1886 to December 1925 for all stocks in the Dow Jones indices. To be included in
the analysis a security must trade at least 200 shares on both exchanges on a given date. All
data are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In col. 1, NYSE 2 CSE/Close is the price
on the NYSE minus the CSE normalized by the average closing price on both exchanges.
Clearinghouse is a stock-specific dummy variable that equals one if a stock is cleared on
the NYSE. In col. 2, NYSE 2 CSE/NYSE Bid-Ask is the left-hand-side variable and is the price
on the NYSE minus the CSE normalized by the bid-ask spread on the NYSE. Col. 3 shows the
results including stock-specific time-varying market liquidity controls on the NYSE and CSE.
These include the bid-ask spread on the NYSE, the dollar trading volume on the NYSE, and
the dollar trading volume on the CSE. Col. 4 shows the results after including call loan rate
(%), the overnight collateralized borrowing rate. Col. 5 includes an interaction term between the clearinghouse dummy variable and the call loan rate (%) as described in specification (10). Col. 6 repeats the analysis in col. 4 but restricting the sample to only stocks
already clearing. All specifications are run with security-level fixed effects, and errors are
clustered at the security level.
* p < 10 percent.
** p < 5 percent.
*** p < 1 percent.

premium is on the high end of those obtained in analyses of modern
counterparty risk in the credit derivative markets. Arora et al. (2012) note
that estimates of the size of the counterparty risk premium for CDSs in the
modern period range from 7 to 20 bp. If we scaled the effects to the size of
the modern NYSE, this would equate to approximately a $40 billion in-
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crease in value caused by the reduction in counterparty risk from the introduction of a clearinghouse.35
We next investigate the drivers of the counterparty risk premium on the
NYSE. Because brokers had to fund substantial levered positions overnight, shocks to overnight borrowing rates were an important determinant
of counterparty risk prior to centralized clearing on the NYSE. In figure 4,
we also plot the 12-month moving average of the broker’s call loan rate. As
expected, prior to the introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE,
stocks tend to trade at a discount relative to identical securities on the
CSE during periods when the call loan rate is high and at a premium when
call loan rates are low. In table 2, we formally investigate whether high call
loan rates are associated with price discounts on the NYSE. We find that call
loan rates appear unrelated to changes in the NYSE-CSE relative prices after the introduction of clearing. Column 4 shows that there is not a statistically significant relationship between the normalized difference in NYSE
and CSE prices and the call loan rate for the full sample period. The reason
is that the relationship is masked by the change in the relationship between
call loan rates and counterparty risk after the introduction of clearing. In
column 5, we estimate equation (10). We find that before the introduction
of clearing, a one standard deviation increase in the call loan rate in the
pre-clearinghouse period is associated with approximately an 8 bp reduction in the price on the NYSE relative to the CSE.36 The effect is not statistically significant, however, after the introduction of clearing. As expected,
we do not find evidence of a relationship between call loan rates and our
normalized measure of relative NYSE-CSE prices after a stock joins the
clearinghouse (see col. 6). The result is consistent with the introduction
of centralized clearing mitigating the impact of funding shocks on counterparty risk for NYSE stocks. In table A5 we rerun the analysis, but instead
look at the effect of commercial paper rates on the premium before and
after the introduction of clearing. Again we find that a rise in funding costs
reduces the value of the NYSE stocks but that this is no longer true after the
introduction of the NYSE clearinghouse. These results hold for both rates,
though they are stronger for call loan rates, when both measures of funding costs are included.37

35
The market cap of $16.6 trillion for the NYSE is taken from the NYSE website as of
August 2014.
36
We find that a 1 percentage point increase in the call loan rate is associated with more
than a 2 bp reduction in the relative price of NYSE stocks that also trade on the CSE, and
the standard deviation of the call loan rate was 3.7 percent before the introduction of the
NYSE clearinghouse.
37
These results are consistent with a relationship between counterparty risk and costs of
borrowing. As noted by Moen and Tallman (2003), call loan rates were funds borrowed on
margin that were callable on notice within the day, but 95 percent of loans were rolled over
with substituted stock collateral. These loans were oftentimes used to cover capital short-
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After the introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE, shocks to
the call loan rate no longer affect prices on the NYSE relative to those
on the CSE. Call loan rates continue to be volatile, however (see fig. 4).
Therefore, we would expect a decline in the volatility of NYSE returns
given the reduction in the volatility of the counterparty risk premium.
In figures 5 and 6, we observe a dramatic decline in the volatility of the
counterparty risk premium after the introduction of clearing that stays
low for more than 30 years after the NYSE clearinghouse is introduced.38
In table 3, we show that the monthly average absolute price difference
of the NYSE relative price falls 20 bp or 0.93 NYSE bid-ask spreads after
the introduction of clearing. These results are robust to including stockspecific time-varying market liquidity controls such as bid-ask spreads on
the NYSE and CSE and the broker call loan rate interacted with a postclearinghouse dummy. As we discussed previously, the results represent a
lower bound on the effects of centralized clearing since other stocks centrally clearing reduce the counterparty risk for non–centrally cleared stocks,
reducing the estimated effect of centralized clearing on counterparty risk.
Since most stocks were already centrally clearing by the end of 1893, we
include a post-1893 dummy variable instead of the post-clearinghouse
dummy. After 1893, the average
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃabsolute price deviation fell by 40 bp. Scaling the absolute values by p=2 to obtain estimates of the change in standard deviation, we get a daily counterparty risk volatility of 50 bp conditional on a transaction.39 Since the average annualized volatility for
stocks on the Dow Jones was 29.6 percent, the daily fundamental volatility
was 1.86 percent, which means that conditional on executing a trade, the
t 1 1 settlement risk induced was as much as 26.9 percent of the total fundamental risk experienced over that same time period.
In table 4, we attempt to distinguish the effects of contagion risk through
network spillovers from the effects of direct counterparty risk. We first include monthly date fixed effects and find that the point estimate for the
effect of centralized clearing on the counterparty risk premium volatility
falls following failed settlements. In this way these rates were not only influenced by aggregate fluctuations in short-term borrowing rates but also likely to have a direct relationship
with counterparty risk on the exchange. Therefore, our results are largely consistent with
clearinghouses not causing or serving as a panacea for macroeconomic financial crises, but
rather that the absence of a clearinghouse can exacerbate a crisis by increasing market turbulence and contagion risk.
38
The stability of the decline in the more than 30 years, through multiple periods of economic turbulence, after the introduction of the NYSE clearinghouse should alleviate concerns regarding any differences in market liquidity, participants, specialization, or settlement period on the two exchanges, since as we will show there is little evidence of a
dramatic change in any of these at the same time the NYSE clearinghouse is introduced.
39
If, instead of assuming normality, we bootstrap from the original residual distribution,
we obtain similar estimates. Since these results are similar to those obtained under normality and those under normality are slightly more conservative, we focus primarily on that interpretation. We thank Neil Shephard for the suggestion.
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F IG . 5.—Absolute value of NYSE-CSE price deviations and centralized clearing on the NYSE (1887–1925). In this figure we show the estimated effect of
the introduction of multilateral net settlement through a centralized clearing party on average absolute value of the price difference of the closing price
of a stock on the NYSE relative to the closing price on the CSE for the same security on the same day. Security market data were hand-collected at a monthly
frequency from the New York Times and Commercial and Financial Chronicle from September 1886 to December 1925 for all stocks in the Dow Jones indices. To be
included in the analysis, a security must trade at least 200 shares on both exchanges on a given date. All data are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
The gray plot is the FNYSE 2 CSEF/NYSE Bid-Ask, which is the price on the NYSE minus the CSE normalized by the bid-ask spread on the NYSE, and the
change is driven by a reduction in volatility on the NYSE. The black dashed lines indicate the average before and after the end of 1893.
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F IG . 6.—Volatility of NYSE-CSE premium and introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE (1887–1925). In this figure we show the estimated effect
of the introduction of multilateral net settlement through a centralized clearing party on the rolling 12-month standard deviation of the closing price of a
stock on the NYSE relative to the closing price on the CSE for the same security on the same day. Security market data were hand-collected at a monthly
frequency from the New York Times and Commercial and Financial Chronicle from September 1886 to December 1925 for all stocks in the Dow Jones indices.
To be included in the analysis a security must trade at least 200 shares on both exchanges on a given date. All data are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. NYSE 2 CSE/NYSE Bid-Ask is the price on the NYSE minus the CSE normalized by the bid-ask spread on the NYSE. The period prior to the
establishment of the NYSE clearinghouse May 17, 1892, is highlighted in gray.

TABLE 3
Counterparty Risk Premium and Establishment of the NYSE Clearinghouse
Dependent Variable
FNYSE 2 FNYSE 2 FNYSE 2 FNYSE 2 FNYSE 2 FNYSE 2
CSEF/ CSEF/NYSE CSEF/
CSEF/
CSEF/
CSEF/
Close (%)
Bid-Ask
Close (%) Close (%) Close (%) Close (%)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Clearinghouse

2.204**
(.105)

2.929***
(.323)

2.207***
(.082)

2.174**
(.089)

2.399***
(.077)

Post-1893
Call loan rate
Call loan rate 
clearinghouse
Constant
Security fixed
effects
Liquidity
controls
Only clearinghouse
No. clusters
Observations
Adjusted R 2

.0081*
(.0046)

.0009
(.0015)

.174***
(.016)

.557***
(.0068)

.544***
(.069)

1.840***
(.210)

.397***
(.055)

2.0067
(.0049)
.360***
(.064)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
90
5,997
.223

No
90
5,984
.165

No
90
5,994
.293

No
90
5,994
.293

Yes
51
3,904
.157

No
54
4,314
.171

Note.—Following econometric specifications (9), (10), and (11), in this table we show
the estimated effect of the introduction of multilateral net settlement through a centralized clearing party on the volatility of the closing price of a stock on the NYSE relative
to the closing price on the CSE for the same security on the same day by looking at the
absolute value of the relative price differences. Security market data were hand-collected
at a monthly frequency from the New York Times and Commercial and Financial Chronicle from
September 1886 to December 1925 for all stocks in the Dow Jones indices. To be included
in the analysis a security must trade at least 200 shares on both exchanges on a given date.
All data are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In col. 1, FNYSE 2 CSEF/Close is
the absolute value of the price on the NYSE relative to the CSE, normalized by the average
closing price on both exchanges as a percentage. Clearinghouse is a stock-specific dummy
variable that equals one if a stock is cleared on the NYSE. In col. 2, FNYSE 2 CSEF/NYSE
Bid-Ask is the volatility of the price on the NYSE minus the CSE normalized by the bid-ask
spread on the NYSE. Col. 3 shows the results with stock-specific time-varying market liquidity controls on the NYSE and CSE including the stock’s bid-ask spread on the NYSE and
dollar trading volume on the NYSE and the CSE. Col. 4 shows results after including call
loan rate (%), the overnight collateralized borrowing rate, and an interaction term between the clearinghouse dummy variable and the call loan rate (%) as described in specification (10). Col. 5 repeats the analysis in col. 4 but restricting the sample to only stocks
already clearing. Col. 6 includes a dummy, post-1893, that is equal to one for all securities
centrally clearing after 1893 and zero prior to May 1892. All specifications are run with
security-level fixed effects, and errors are clustered at the security level.
* p < 10 percent.
** p < 5 percent.
*** p < 1 percent.

718

TABLE 4
Contagion (Indirect Counterparty) Risk
Dependent Variable
FNYSE 2
CSEF/NYSE
Bid-Ask
(1)

FNYSE 2
CSEF/
Close (%)
(2)

% of Dow clearing
Clearinghouse

2.370
(.269)

2.156*
(.088)

FNYSE 2
CSEF/NYSE
Bid-Ask
(3)
2.508*
(.295)
2.558***
(.108)

High volume
dummy  % of
Dow clearing

Security fixed
effects
Date fixed effects
Stock liquidity
controls
Only preclearing
stocks
No. clusters
Observations
Adjusted R 2

.328
(.278)

2.772**
(.308)

High volume
dummy
Constant

FNYSE 2
CSEF/NYSE
Bid-Ask
(4)

FNYSE 2
CSEF/
Close (%)
(5)
.020
(.16)

2.300**
(.137)

1.830**
(.119)

.582***
(.038)

2.091***
(.210)

.538**
(.203)
1.199***
(.193)

.201**
(.096)
.329***
(.098)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
90
5,983
.236

No
90
5,994
.326

No
90
5,983
.186

Yes
50
2,086
.332

Yes
50
2,090
.398

Note.—Following econometric specification (12), in this table we show the estimated effect of the introduction of multilateral net settlement through a centralized clearing party on
the closing price of a stock on the NYSE relative to the closing price on the CSE for the same
security on the same day broken out by contagion risk and direct counterparty risk. Security
market data were hand-collected at a monthly frequency from the New York Times and Commercial and Financial Chronicle from September 1886 to December 1925 for all stocks in the
Dow Jones indices. To be included in the analysis a security must trade at least 200 shares
on both exchanges on a given date. All data are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
In col. 1, FNYSE 2 CSEF/NYSE Bid-Ask is an estimate of monthly volatility of the price on
the NYSE relative to the CSE, normalized by the bid-ask spread on the NYSE. Clearinghouse
is a stock-specific dummy variable that equals one if a stock is cleared on the NYSE. This column includes date fixed effects. Col. 2 is the same as col. 1, but FNYSE 2 CSEF/NYSE Close is
the volatility of the price on the NYSE minus the CSE normalized by the average closing price
on both exchanges as a percentage. Col. 3 includes the effects of spillovers by including % of
Dow clearing, which is the percentage of NYSE stocks in a Dow Jones index currently centrally clearing in addition to the clearinghouse dummy. Col. 4 restricts the sample to only
stocks not centrally clearing to show spillover effects and contagion risk. This regression includes variable high trading volume, which equals one if the dollar trading volume is higher
than the median for all stocks over the period. This variable is then interacted with % of Dow
clearing. Col. 5 is the same as col. 4 but looks at FNYSE 2 CSEF/NYSE Close. All specifications are run with security-level fixed effects, and errors are clustered at the security level.
* p < 10 percent.
** p < 5 percent.
*** p < 1 percent.
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falls from 20.93 (col. 2 of table 3) to 20.37 (col. 1 of table 4) when normalizing by bid-ask spread, but moves only from 20.20 (col. 3 of table 3) to
20.16 (col. 2 of table 4) when normalizing by stock price. This suggests
that the netting of other stocks increases the prices of stocks that have
not yet cleared and that effect is picked up by the date fixed effects. The
clearinghouse dummy remains marginally significant only when we normalize by the bid-ask spread. If the stocks of large firms have a high price,
a low bid-ask spread, and large trading volume, this is what we would expect
because traders in those securities would be more exposed to traders in the
rest of the broker network. To test this explicitly, in column 3 we remove
the date fixed effects and replace them with a dummy variable equal to
one if the stock is centrally cleared and the percentage of all stocks centrally clearing. We find that the clearinghouse dummy is now a statistically
significant 20.56 bid-ask spreads and the coefficient on the percentage of
all stocks centrally clearing is a marginally significant 0.51.40 Hence, spillover effects are likely to be important for the reduction of counterparty
risk.
Since contagion risk depends on how connected traders of a given stock
are to the rest of the trader network, we expect stocks trading higher volumes (relative to their average) on a particular day to be more affected
by others stocks centrally clearing because they are more connected to
the network. In columns 4 and 5 of table 4 we consider the effect of the
percentage of stocks centrally clearing on the relative prices of stocks that
have not yet cleared and include a dummy for high trading volume.41 Prior
to clearing, on high-volume days, counterparty risk premium volatility is
higher on the NYSE, but that effect disappears as more and more Dow
stocks clear. In particular, the reduction in the counterparty risk (relative
stocks on low-volume days) is 0.77 bid-ask spreads times the percentage
of Dow stocks centrally clearing (col. 4) or 30 bp times the percentage
of Dow stocks centrally clearing (col. 5). If we combine the results of the
high–trading volume dummy and the interaction term, we can see that
prior to centrally clearing, stocks with a high trading volume on a given
day are associated with large volatility in the price difference; but after centrally clearing the difference is no longer statistically significant. On lowvolume days, the volatility of the counterparty risk premium does not
change in a significant way after the onset of clearing.
We run a number of robustness checks to test whether our results are
driven by changes in counterparty risk coming from the introduction of
clearing or changes in asynchronous trading, market liquidity, or financial
40
The coefficient on the percentage of Dow clearing has a natural interpretation since it
is the expected reduction in counterparty risk if 100 percent of all other stocks clear.
41
The high volume dummy equals one for stocks with a trading volume higher than the
median trading volume.
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crises. If asynchronous trading declines after the introduction of clearing,
this might confound interpretation of our results. Despite the sudden decline in counterparty risk depicted by figures 5 and 6, there is not a sudden
increase in trading volume that would be consistent with a story about a decline or change in asynchronous trading for the two rival exchanges.42 The
lack of any sudden change in volume is also inconsistent with results being
driven by changes in relative market liquidity. In columns 1 and 2 of table 5
we do not find a significant change in relative trading volumes after the introduction of clearing. We also show in column 3 that there is little evidence of increased relative price impact since the Amihud illiquidity measure sees no statistically significant change. We also show in columns 4–6 of
table 5 that all baseline results are robust to restricting our analysis to only
days with at least 500 shares (five standard contracts) traded on both exchanges and including nonlinear relative measures of market liquidity
on both exchanges for each stock as a control. In columns 1–3 of table A3,
we show that the basic tenor of the results remains unchanged when we use
daily data for all stocks on the NYSE or CSE. The results hold if we consider
only stocks with at least 20 observations before and after the introduction
of clearing, including estimated bid-ask spreads on the CSE as a control,
and using open instead of closing prices. Again, the findings are not consistent with changes in asynchronous trading or market liquidity as drivers
of the change in the relative NYSE-CSE price volatility after the introduction of clearing. We examine NYSE-CSE relative bid-ask spreads for the
same securities in figure A2 and column 6 of table A3. We again do not find
evidence of a sudden change in the relative market liquidity between the
NYSE and CSE.43 Even though there is not a statistically significant change
in any of our market liquidity proxies, it is still theoretically possible for
them to affect pricing, so in column 6 of table 5 we include controls for
42
For more details see fig. A1. In addition to practical frictions that could slow any transition of volume from one exchange to another, it has been shown that in the presence of
limited competition, as existed during this period, market makers can earn positive profits
and relationship dealers could prevent trading on either exchange from disappearing
(Bernhardt et al. 2005; Desgranges and Foucault 2005).
43
Work by O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2014) suggests that in certain market environments the
type of information transmitted between odd-lot trades could differ from regular transactions. Intraday trading data that would let us discern odd-lot trading are not available, but
the percentage of stocks whose volume of shares does not end in a multiple of 100 shares
should at least indicate the percentage of trading days with at least one odd-lot trade. Prior
to the introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE, for the NYSE and CSE, respectively, among the main sample in the paper, 90.1 percent and 91.8 percent of security trading day volumes were not multiples of 100. While over the whole sample there ended up
being significantly more security trading days with non-100-share multiples of trading on
the NYSE than on the CSE, these are really concentrated in the period after 1900 when
volumes rose dramatically. If we focus on just the period prior to 1900, but after the introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE for these securities, these were just 85.2 percent
and 85.8 percent, respectively. Again these are consistent with little evidence of our effect being driven by a significant change in the types of trading occurring on each exchange.
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Security fixed
effects
Stock liquidity
controls
Relative liquidity
controls
Period
Minimum traded
shares
Data frequency
Price used

Constant

Clearinghouse

No
No
1886–1925
200
Monthly
Close

No

No
1886–1925

200
Monthly
Close

200
Monthly
Close

No
1886–1925

No

Yes

2.103
(.067)
.363***
(.044)

23.45
(2.49)
20.96***
(1.62)
Yes

Amihud Illiquidity
(NYSE/CSE)
(3)

Volume
(% CSE)
(2)

Yes

251
(354)
1,311***
(231)

$000s Volume
(NYSE 2 CSE)
(1)

500
Monthly
Close

No
1886–1925

Yes

Yes

2.226**
(.101)
.386***
(.0697)

FNYSE 2 CSEF/
Close (%)
(4)

Dependent Variable

500
Monthly
Close

No
1886–1925

Yes

Yes

.289***
(.077)
2.147***
(.059)

NYSE 2 CSE/
Close (%)
(5)

TABLE 5
Microstructure Noise and Market Liquidity Robustness Tests

200
Monthly
Close

Yes
1888–1925

Yes

Yes

.224***
(.079)
2.245
(.203)

NYSE 2 CSE/
Close (%)
(6)

200
Monthly
Close

No
1886–1908

Yes

Yes

.238***
(.059)
2.152***
(.055)

NYSE 2 CSE/
Close (%)
(7)

723

90
5,996
.213

90
5,996
.280

Volume
(% CSE)
(2)
89
5,623
.185

Amihud Illiquidity
(NYSE/CSE)
(3)
85
4,272
.306

FNYSE 2 CSEF/
Close (%)
(4)
85
4,272
.019

NYSE 2 CSE/
Close (%)
(5)
88
5,504
.020

NYSE 2 CSE/
Close (%)
(6)
62
2,983
.010

NYSE 2 CSE/
Close (%)
(7)

Note.—In this table, we show that the introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE is not associated with a change in the relative trading on the
NYSE vs. the CSE and that the introduction of multilateral net settlement through a centralized clearing party reduced the premium and volatility of the
closing price of a stock on the NYSE relative to the closing price on the CSE for the same security on the same day. Security market data were handcollected at a monthly frequency from the New York Times and Commercial and Financial Chronicle from September 1886 to December 1925 for all stocks
in the Dow Jones indices. To be included in the analysis a security must trade at least 200 shares on both exchanges on a given date. All data are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In col. 1, $ Volume (NYSE 2 CSE) is the difference in the dollar volume of trading for a stock on the NYSE minus the
volume on the CSE on the same day. Clearinghouse is a stock-specific dummy variable that equals one if a stock is cleared on the NYSE. Col. 2 shows
the same as col. 1, but now the variable is Volume (% CSE), which is the dollar trading volume on the CSE divided by the sum of the trading volume
on the NYSE and CSE for a given security on a given day. Col. 3 is the same specification as col. 2, but the left-hand-side variable is the Amihud illiquidity
measure, ðjNYSE Rett j=NYSE Salest Þ=ðjCSE Rett j=CSE Salest Þ. In specifications in cols. 4 and 5 securities are restricted to those with at least 500 contracts
trading on the NYSE and CSE on a given day. In col. 4, FNYSE 2 CSEF/Close is an estimate of monthly volatility of the price on the NYSE relative to the
CSE by looking at the absolute price deviation, normalized by the average closing price on both exchanges as a percentage. In col. 5, NYSE 2 CSE/Close is
the price on the NYSE minus the CSE normalized by the average closing price on both exchanges. Col. 6 is the same as col. 5 but restricts only to at least
200 shares traded on both exchanges and includes relative stock-specific time-varying market liquidity controls. These include $ Volume (NYSE 2 CSE),
Volume (% CSE), the Amihud illiquidity measures on both exchanges and their ratio, seat prices on the NYSE and CSE and their ratio, and natural logs of
dollar volume on both the NYSE and CSE. Col. 7 repeats the baseline results in table 2, col. 1, but only for the period prior to passage of the AldrichVreeland Act in 1909. All specifications are run with security-level fixed effects, and errors are clustered at the security level.
* p < 10 percent.
** p < 5 percent.
*** p < 1 percent.

No. clusters
Observations
Adjusted R 2

$000s Volume
(NYSE 2 CSE)
(1)

Dependent Variable

TABLE 5 (CONTINUED)
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$ Volume (NYSE-CSE), Volume (% CSE), the Amihud illiquidity measures
on both exchanges and their ratio, seat prices on the NYSE and CSE and
their ratio, and natural logs of dollar volume on both the NYSE and CSE.44
The post-1983 dummy remains statistically significant, with the market liquidity controls suggesting that changes in the relative prices are not driven
by any changes in the market liquidity on either exchange.45 As a further
robustness check we also rerun our analysis using identical securities simultaneously listed on the BSE as a control in column 8 of table A3 and find
that results are consistent with our specifications using the CSE. We again
find a decline in price dispersion after the clearinghouse is introduced on
the NYSE relative to identical securities’ closing prices on the BSE. The
BSE introduced a clearinghouse in January of 1892. Several securities were
dual-listed on the BSE and the NYSE, although not as many as the CSE.
The fact that we find similar results using the BSE as a control should alleviate concerns that a CSE-specific change could be driving results.
As a robustness check for our volatility estimator, in column 7 of table A3,
we use the volatility estimator based on the high and low values on each
exchange as the dependent variable. According to Parkinson (1980), the
difference between the high and low values is proportional to volatility.
The results in column 7 suggest that stocks on the CSE that also traded
on the NYSE had 4 percent lower volatility when including market liquidity
controls before the introduction of the clearinghouse. The difference in
volatility between NYSE and CSE dual-listed securities disappeared after
the onset of centralized clearing on the Big Board. The 4 percent reduction in the volatility of NYSE securities is statistically significant and consistent with the 3.0–4.8 percent estimate obtained using the primary volatility
estimator in this paper.
Another possibility is that the reduction in counterparty risk is driven
by reduced macroeconomic risk, independent of the introduction of
clearing. First, we find, that relative prices were no longer sensitive to call
loan rate shocks after the introduction of centralized clearing, which suggests that changes in the volatility of call loan shocks, even if they did occur, do not drive our results. The possibility also seems unlikely because
in the period after centralized clearing there were numerous major panics, including the Panic of 1907, in which call loan rates increased precipitously. Indeed, the incidence of financial crises did not fall until the
introduction of the Federal Reserve (see Bernstein et al. [2010] and

44
Since the number of seats on the NYSE was fixed, the primary driver of seat prices was
changes in trading volume. Thus changes in seat prices provide a good estimate of changes
in expectations about future exchange trading volumes.
45
We also found no substantive changes in corporate governance on either exchange
around this time period, besides those related to the introduction of a clearinghouse on
the NYSE.
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fig. A3). Shea (1911, 199) noted that “the clearing system of the exchange
was severely tested during the Panic of 1907, and its efficiency was fully
demonstrated.” The results are also robust to restricting our analysis to
the period prior to the passage of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act in 1908 and
the subsequent introduction of the Federal Reserve (col. 7 of table 5).
This leaves a 17-year period after the introduction of centralized clearing
on the NYSE in which conditions were as ripe for financial crises as the period prior to 1892.
Examining the period prior to 1907 also shows that the results are not
driven by the introduction of the mutualization of risk on the NYSE clearinghouse in April of 1920, accusations of fraud on the CSE beginning in
February of 1922, or the subsequent decline in volume on the CSE. In table 6 we explicitly examine the introduction of mutualization of risk in
April 1920 prior to the accusations of fraud on the CSE in February
1922. We do not find statistically significant evidence of changes in counterparty risk driven by mutualization of risk. These results should be interpreted with caution given the limited post-mutualization period, but we
do not find any evidence that the reduction in counterparty risk caused
by introduction of centralized clearing in 1892 was negated, or significantly improved, by the separate introduction of mutualization of risk.
VI.

Conclusion

The dramatic rise in counterparty risk in the OTC derivatives markets
during the recent financial crisis has brought the role clearinghouses
play in reducing market turbulence to the forefront of public policy debate. In this paper, we show that a clearinghouse can improve financial
stability in asset markets by reducing counterparty risk. We use a novel
historical experiment to cleanly identify the change in counterparty risk
of NYSE stocks after the introduction of a clearinghouse in 1892. We can
identify the effect of introducing centralized clearing for NYSE stocks
because the same securities were trading concurrently on the CSE, a rival
exchange that already had centralized clearing. This is important because the introduction of centralized clearing is usually driven by macroeconomic turbulence, so that before versus after comparisons can be contaminated by changes in fundamental security value and risk. In our
setting, however, changes in counterparty and illiquidity risk can be more
easily attributed to the introduction of a clearinghouse. Our results suggest that prior to the introduction of net settlement on the NYSE, identical stocks on the NYSE traded at a discount of 9 bp relative to the CSE, the
NYSE’s principal competitor. After the establishment of a clearinghouse,
NSYE stocks traded at a premium of 15 bp. The difference of 24 bp is statistically significant. Furthermore, the change can be attributed almost entirely to the reduction in counterparty risk.
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TABLE 6
Counterparty Risk and the Introduction of NYSE Novation
Dependent Variable
NYSE 2 CSE/ NYSE 2 CSE/
Close (%)
Close (%)
(1)
(2)

Novation
Constant
Security fixed effects
Stock liquidity controls
NYSE/CSE stock liquidity controls
Period
Only postclearing
stocks
No. clusters
Observations
Adjusted R 2

NYSE 2 CSE/
NYSE Bid-Ask
(3)

FNYSE 2 CSEF/
NYSE Bid-Ask
(4)

2.0462
(.0434)
.0548***
(.0028)
Yes

2.1198
(.0762)
2.326
(.212)
Yes

2.1391
(.1240)
.1828***
(.0079)
Yes

.0912
(.1011)
1.064***
(.0065)
Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No
Sept. 1886–
Jan. 1922

Yes
Sept. 1886–
Jan. 1922

No
Sept. 1886–
Jan. 1922

No
Sept. 1886–
Jan. 1922

Yes
51
3,487
.019

Yes
50
3,313
.046

Yes
51
3,479
.012

Yes
51
3,479
.017

Note.—In this table we show that the introduction of novation (mutualization of risk
though a centralized counterparty) on the NYSE in April 1920 does not appear to significantly affect the counterparty risk premium between the NYSE and CSE. Security market
data were hand-collected and are analyzed at a monthly frequency from the New York Times
and Commercial and Financial Chronicle from September 1886 to January 1922 for all stocks
in the Dow Jones indices. The period February 1922–December 1925 is excluded from this
analysis because of accusations of fraud on the CSE, which eventually led to its downfall,
beginning with the failure of MacMasters & Co. in February 1922. To be included in the
analysis a security must trade at least 200 shares on both exchanges on a given date. All data
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In col. 1, NYSE 2 CSE/Close is the price on
the NYSE minus the CSE normalized by the average closing price on both exchanges, and
novation is a dummy variable equal to one if the date is after April 1920. Col. 2 is the same
as col. 1 but includes relative stock-specific time-varying market liquidity controls. These
include $ Volume (NYSE 2 CSE), Volume (% CSE), the Amihud illiquidity measures on
both exchanges and their ratio, seat prices on the NYSE and CSE and their ratio, and natural logs of dollar volume on both the NYSE and CSE. In col. 3, NYSE 2 CSE/NYSE BidAsk is the left-hand-side variable and is the price on the NYSE minus the CSE normalized by
the bid-ask spread on the NYSE. In col. 4, FNYSE 2 CSEF/Close is an estimate of monthly
volatility of the price on the NYSE relative to the CSE by looking at the absolute price deviation, normalized by the average closing price on both exchanges as a percentage. All
specifications are run with security-level fixed effects, and errors are clustered at the security level.
* p < 10 percent.
** p < 5 percent.
*** p < 1 percent.

Before the establishment of the NYSE clearinghouse, the NYSE traded
at a premium relative to the same stocks on the CSE the majority of the
time. However, when overnight collateralized borrowing rates rose sharply,
prices on the NYSE fell precipitously relative to those on the CSE. A one
standard deviation increase in interest rates (3.7 percentage points) re-
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duced the value of stocks on the NYSE by 8 bp, relative to identical stocks
on the CSE. After the introduction of clearing, the differences between
prices on the NYSE and the CSE were no longer affected by changes in
these overnight funding rates. Call loan rates remained volatile, but NYSE
stock return volatility fell dramatically after centralized clearing reduced
settlement risk. We also use the staggered introduction of centralized clearing on the NYSE to show that at least half of this reduction in counterparty
risk is driven by a reduction in contagion risk through spillovers in the
trader network.
Overall, our results indicate that clearinghouses can play a significant
role in improving market stability and increase asset values by reducing
network contagion and counterparty risk. Two of the primary functions
of clearinghouses are netting without novation and mutualization of
risk. We demonstrate that even in the absence of a centralized counterparty, policies aimed at introducing centralized clearing through a clearinghouse can substantially increase netting and subsequently improve
global financial stability.
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